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Although prediction plays a prominent role in mental processing, we have only limited understanding of
how the brain generates and employs predictions. This paper develops a theoretical framework in three
steps. First I propose a process model that describes how predictions are produced and are linked to
behavior. Subsequently I describe a generative mechanism, consisting of the selective ampliﬁcation of
neural dynamics in the context of boundary conditions. I hypothesize that this mechanism is active as a
process engine in every mental process, and that therefore each mental process proceeds in two stages:
(i) the formation of process boundary conditions; (ii) the bringing about of the process function by the
operation ewithin the boundary conditions e of a relatively ‘blind’ generative process. Thirdly, from this
hypothesis I derive a strategy for describing processes formally. The result is a multilevel framework that
may also be useful for studying mental processes in general.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is consensus about the importance of prediction inmental
processing, but no broadly accepted theory is available that ex-
plains how the central nervous system (CNS) generates and em-
ploys predictions, and how this CNS function has evolved. In order
to address these issues this paper develops a multilevel process
model of the mental mechanisms that underlie behavior. This re-
lates to a system-level approach, which means that the focus is on
the functions of processes rather than on their neurophysiological
mechanisms.
The process model is developed from a biological perspective in
the sense that it applies to all animals with a CNS, and that mental
functions are supposed to be related to facing the challenges that
life imposes on the individual regarding survival and reproduction.
In this perspective, using predictions is a speciﬁc strategy employed
by the CNS for accomplishing its task of orchestrating actions that
improve the chances of survival. Prominent in that strategy is the
descriptive and predictive model of the environment on which the
organism relies for its goal-directed behavior.
In 2003 Karl Friston made an important contribution to the so-
called predictive brain approach of mental processing by describingorganic forward model of the
active noise shaping.
td. This is an open access article uthe perception process as a cascade of inference loops. According to
that description, in each loop the incoming sensory information is
compared with predictions that have been generated in earlier
loops, and detected differences are employed for adjusting the
predictions. Friston also showed that this cascade can be described
in terms of hierarchical predictive coding, which is a form of
Bayesian probability calculus (Friston, 2003). This mathematical
process description makes it possible to formulate quantitative
hypotheses that can be tested experimentally (Clark, 2013; Hohwy,
2013).
Moreover Friston proposed that action could be described as an
active inference that brings prediction of percepts and actual
observation closer to each other, or in his ownwords: ‘much innate
orientating and tracking behavior is simply a reﬂection of the
brain's inherent tendency to maintain a predictable sensory input’
(Friston, 2003). This proposal has received some criticism
(Bickhard, in press b; Clark, 2013), because it does not address some
of the aspects of action that are highly relevant for survival and
reproduction. For instance, according to the proposed description
the playful behavior of a child could be explicated as the conse-
quence of explaining away the child's sensory inputs. One of the
important aspects that is ignored in this description is the presence
of a positive decision bias in the child's mind that not only activates
its playful behavior, but also promotes curiosity, exploration and
learning per se (Singh, Lewis, Barto, & Sorg, 2010).
This paper develops a general framework for mental processing
in the context of which different relevant aspects of action can bender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Flow diagram showing how anticipation improves the accuracy of action timing.
Top: Without anticipation. A sensory stimulus triggers a ﬁxed response scheme in
accordance with which the action is executed. The time needed for signal transport
and signal processing causes action delay. Bottom: The action is prepared in advance,
which includes perceptual activity; the early start of the action compensates for signal
delay, so precise timing of the crucial part of the action can be achieved. An example is
the bird of prey that intercepts a small bird in ﬂight: ‘action 1’ is the swoop towards the
prey, which is so precisely aimed and timed that impact actually occurs; during ‘action
2’, the bird secures the prey.
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turn is based on prediction. For developing this framework the
forward model method is employed, a method that has been
applied during the past decades for tackling a wide variety of
problems in cognition, perception, robotics and computer vision
(e.g. Grush, 2004; Rao & Ballard, 1997; Wolpert, Ghahramani, &
Jordan, 1995; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). These studies have led to
what are known as enactivist formulations of perception e such as
the theory on sensory-motor contingencies e that take an
embodied approach and regard perception as probing the envi-
ronment (e.g. O'Regan & No€e, 2001; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,
1991).
The framework has important aspects in common with the
interactivist approach developed by Donald Campbell and Mark
Bickhard (Bickhard, 2009, in press a & b; Bickhard & Campbell,
2003). Both approaches are process-based instead of substance-
oriented. In addition, both approaches provide an alternative for
what is often characterized as the input-processor model of brain
function. Finally, in both frameworks the focus on future possibil-
ities, i.e., anticipation, is an essential element, and normativity is
considered to be of vital importance; however, the model devel-
oped here is more speciﬁc about the processes by which norma-
tivity is achieved. More similarities will appear throughout the
paper. Because of these similarities the proposed framework can be
tagged in twoways: as a predictive brain approach with the special
feature that it is speciﬁc regarding normativity, and as an interac-
tivist model with emphasis on anticipation. The most noticeable
difference between the two approaches is in the basic argumen-
tation: the present paper mainly argues from biological plausibility
with survival as the main goal, while in the interactivist model this
argument plays a less prominent part.
2. A process model of how predictions are generated and
used
This section focuses on anticipation, which is the process of
orchestrating action in advance. It discusses the function of antic-
ipation, its evolution, the role of prediction in it, and howprediction
is produced.
2.1. The function and evolution of anticipation
For an animal, anticipation has the major advantage that it al-
lows very precise timing of actions such as the interception of a fast
moving prey or the escape from an attacker. As Fig. 1 explains, a
crucial factor for precise timing is the compensation of the action
delay caused by time-consuming neural processes such as the
processing of sensory signals by the CNS and the transmission of
signals from the sensor to the CNS, and from the CNS to the
muscles.
Anticipation also has other beneﬁts: it provides the opportunity
to avoid risks, to recognize opportunities on time, and to notice
mistakes so that the animal can adapt its behavioral strategies
accordingly. The latter makes the creature antifragile, which means
that exposure to disturbances improves its capabilities (Taleb,
2012). Also at basic processing level anticipation has advantages:
incomplete perceptual information may be ﬁlled in from predic-
tion, which enhances the effectiveness of the perception process
under harsh conditions, and it allows ﬁltering out irrelevant sen-
sory data, as will be discussed below. For more beneﬁts see e.g.
Wolpert et al., 1995. Because reduction of action delay has a direct
and signiﬁcant impact on survival, this beneﬁt is likely to have been
the main driving power for the development e during brain evo-
lution e of anticipation as a key function of the CNS.
Organisms that cannot anticipate are entirely dependent on theforces exerted on them from the surroundings; an example is
seaweed that is passively moved around by the tide. In stark
contrast, an anticipating animal can plan and shape its own course
of action because it is able to manipulate time and space in its
mind; in this way it can escape from imprisonment in here-and-
now causality.
2.2. Anticipation builds on simulation processes
Anticipation can only improve the chances of survival if
adequate action choices can be made before the action is executed.
This implies that the CNS must be able to develop a notion about
how an intended action can be expected to unfold, and in particular
about what the action consequences will be. I follow Germund
Hesslow's proposal that action predictions are produced by means
of action simulation processes (Hesslow, 2012). An action simula-
tion process consists of a swift and sketchy mental exploration of
the course of the intended action with a degree of detail that is just
good enough for making an adequate action choice. In terms of
probability calculus: the simulation process reduces the uncer-
tainty regarding future mental states to an acceptable level.
Within the simulation process an embodied valuation process e
which will be described in Section 2.5.1e is active that produces an
indication of the extent to which the expected action outcome
contributes to the welfare of the animal; this makes the simulation
normative.
Simulated actions take place e imaginatively e in an environ-
ment that may be different from the present surroundings. The
estimation of this remote environment requires a second simula-
tion activity: the simulation of that environment. A relevant
consideration in that context is that as an animal moves through its
environment, many aspects of the surroundings change only
gradually, so it would be a waste of effort to produce a new simu-
lation of the environment for every action simulation. It is more
efﬁcient e and therefore more likely e for the CNS to employ the
following strategy: (i) it produces e by means of simulation e one
comprehensive and realistic model of all the relevant aspects of the
present environment; (ii) it continually updates this model by
means of ongoing observation of the surroundings; (iii) for every
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information from this model by means of a swift and dedicated
extrapolation. I call the sophisticated model of the environment:
the ‘organic forward model of the environment’, or OFM. The OFM
seems similar to what Bickhard calls the ‘situation knowledge web’
(Bickhard, 2009).
In this perspective, every goal-directed action is based on the
OFM. So action is not directly based on the sensory stimuli received
from the physical environment; instead of guiding action, percep-
tion merely updates the OFM. This view is supported by, e.g., the
observation of the prey catching behavior of dragonﬂies (Combes,
2014). Note that sensory impressions an sich are meaningless;
they become meaningful by means of their integration within the
OFM.
The fact that action preparation strictly depends on the OFM
implies that an extremely reliable mechanism must be active that
keeps the OFM continually tuned to the environment. Since this
tuning can only be achieved by means of interaction with the
environment, that interaction is an indispensible element of the
OFM approach; this provides a link with the interactivist frame-
work (Bickhard, 2009).
The strict dependence of action preparation on the OFM has a
conceptual consequence. The frugal nature of CNS operation makes
it plausible that the CNS maintains no other models of the envi-
ronment than the one that it needs for action orchestration, which
is the OFM. Therefore, what one experiences as one's environment
is not the physical environment but one's OFM, which may be
supplemented by meaningless fresh sensory impressions. This is
not a new insight: for instance Ernst von Glasersfeld came to a
similar conclusion, which he called the radical constructivist
worldview (Glasersfeld, 1995). The independence of one's sense of
reality from perception can be conﬁrmed by a simple experiment:
when one closes the eyes visual details disappear, but one still has a
fairly realistic idea available about what the world around looks
like, and about how objects are arranged there, which is one's OFM.
In this perspective, the term ‘perceptual presence’ e which
means that the objects of perception are experienced as real, as
obviously belonging to the world (Seth, 2014) e is a contradictio in
terminis since the words ‘perceptual’ and ‘presence’ represent two
issues that are not directly related. Stated differently, in the
constructivist perspective supported here the direct coupling be-
tween perception and the experienced surrounding e which most
people intuitively assume e is an illusion.
2.3. Properties of the OFM
The OFM is a rather complicated mental construction: not only
does it contain models of the physical objects that are supposedly
present in the surroundings, enriched with attributes such as
hardness and permanence, but it also comprises estimations of
how these objects move, interact and will change, and it provides
information about past experiences with the objects. Especially the
human OFM also contains models of abstract and cultural entities.
Note that the estimations about the future do not arise from
clairvoyance but are extrapolations from earlier experiences and
previously made mental simulations.
The effectiveness of anticipation critically relies on the quality of
the OFM, so in order to be able to anticipate adequately at all times
and in varying circumstances the OFM needs to be continually
coherent, efﬁcient, adaptable and well updated. The processes that
construct the OFM and keep it up and running in accordance with
these requirements probably account for a signiﬁcant part of the
brain's baseline activity (e.g., Raichle & Snyder, 2007).
As regards its content, the OFM seems to have much in common
with the ‘counterfactual-rich generative model’ introduced by AnilSeth (Seth, 2014). Note that the correspondence with Seth's
approach is restricted to this aspect: as was discussed above, the
idea that perception and awareness of the environment are directly
coupled e which Seth assumes e is rejected here.
2.4. Processes that produce and sustain the OFM
This section describes two elementarymental processes that are
involved in generating and maintaining the OFM.
2.4.1. Objectiﬁcation
‘Object concepts’ are expectations about issues and objects that
are supposed to be present in the physical and cultural environ-
ments; they are time-independent and invariant under a wide
range of environmental conditions and activities (Bickhard, in press
a). Object concepts are the building blocks of the OFM; they have
also been called models, heuristics, prior beliefs or sensorimotor
contingencies (O'Regan & No€e, 2001).
Having object concepts available greatly enhances the effec-
tiveness of anticipation because the CNS can handle these relatively
rugged and ready-for-use mental entities far more effectively than
the ﬂeeting and often complicated signal patterns that produce
sensory impressions. Arranging object concepts into a hierarchical
organization e which is the OFM e enhances the effectiveness of
CNS operation further. The process of generating and organizing
object concepts is known as ‘objectiﬁcation’ (Piaget, 1954).
The OFM is well adapted to the physical and cultural environ-
ments in which it developed because most object concepts are
created from experiences and are fact-checked by means of
perception every time they are employed in action. The OFM con-
struction process is subject to twomajor limitations. Its resulte the
OFM content e is restricted to what has been experienced or
taught. The other restriction is that each adaptation step must build
on the previous state of the OFM, which means that only adapta-
tions are possible regarding issues that are ‘one step removed’ from
previous knowledge. In terms of probability calculus, this may be
compared to belief updating in Bayesian formulations, where pre-
vious knowledge represents prior beliefs, and adaptations consti-
tute posterior inferences (Friston, private communication).
2.4.2. Perception
The construction and maintenance of the OFM depends on
perception. The forward model view of mental processing implies
that a distinction needs to be made between two main classes of
perceptual activity, which I call: ‘unprepared perception’ and
‘prepared perception’ respectively.
In the unprepared mode of perception, a salient sensory stim-
ulus e a sharp sound, a sudden movement in the peripheral ﬁeld of
view, or a penetrating smell e has direct and unconditional access
to the CNS via mechanisms that are genetically determined. These
stimuli are called salient because they may indicate the presence of
imminent danger, a mate or prey, which is information that is
highly relevant for survival and reproduction. In the CNS this type
of stimulus may trigger the orchestration of a reﬂex, which is an
immediate and unconditional response in the form of a movement
and/or the arousal of attention. It is likely that unprepared
perception mechanisms evolved synchronously with the develop-
ment of sensors, long before prepared perception emerged.
Prepared perception is an active search for information in the
environment; besides the delivery of sensor signals it also com-
prises actions that improve the perception such as orienting the
head, removing objects that are in the way, and shifting the
attention. Its primary function is updating the OFM, not guiding
action directly. A prepared perception activity is triggered by the
detection of an unacceptable uncertainty within the OFM (Gottlieb,
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of an action decision process. Two action options are simulated in
the context of the OFM that is continually updated by prepared perception. For each
action option a value is generated that reﬂects the estimated contribution to the
chances of survival. The evaluation phase identiﬁes the most desirable action option by
comparing the values. The chosen action is executed only if its value is sufﬁciently
high; this decision is symbolized by ‘go/no go’.
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that uncertainty. Since prepared perception is indispensable for
adequate anticipation, both are likely to have co-evolved during
brain evolution.
Because the purpose of a prepared perception activity is avail-
able in advance, the CNS can develop an expectation about the
function and relevance of what will be perceived. This prior
knowledge is most useful, since it allows blocking irrelevant sen-
sory data at an early stage of the perception process based on its
expected relevance, and it makes it possible to integrate sensory
information within the OFM on the basis of its expected function.
Both measures enhance the effectiveness of anticipation
considerably.
Since the world is hardly ever what one expects it to be, pre-
pared perception should not depend too strictly on what is pre-
dicted. One should at least be able to cope with ‘mild surprises’,
perceptions that are close to expectation. I propose that the
following neural-level mechanism is instrumental in achieving
that.
A general property of neural networks is that the random
spiking of individual neurons introduces iterant dynamics of neural
activity, which is also called self-organized criticality (Friston,
Breakspear, & Deco, 2012; McDonnell & Ward, 2011; Rolls &
Deco, 2010). For convenience, I refer to this random neural activ-
ity as ‘noise’. Noise signals disturb the OFM, so a ‘noise repair
process’ must be continually active that restores the coherence of
the OFM; the process that underlies this mechanism will be dis-
cussed in Section 3. This repair mechanism also restores OFM
coherence after it has been disturbed by the arrival of an unex-
pected sensory signal e provided that its divergence from what is
expected is not too large; the effect of that restoration process is
that it integrates mild surprises within the OFM.
2.5. Making decisions
This section discusses how the OFM is employed in the action
decision process.
2.5.1. Normativity by means of embodied valuation
Normativity is of vital importance: it is for instance required for
making an adequate ‘ﬁght or ﬂight’ decision. This paragraph pro-
poses an underlyingmechanism; the next paragraph describes how
that mechanism is instrumental in action preparation.
Action decisions can only be expected to improve the chances of
survival if a decision criterion is available that bears relevance to
survival; moreover, in situations where delay of action would be
dangerous the immediate accessibility of this criterion is of vital
importance. Unfortunately there seems no process theory available
that adequately deals with these two aspects. Since insight in how
choices are made is an indispensable element of any theory on
mental processing, a decision valuation mechanism that duly ad-
dresses both aspects will be hypothesized here.
A problem is that effectively estimating how well an intended
action will contribute to survival is likely to be way beyond the
imaginative power of an animal. A practical and relevant alternative
is that the animal considers e instead of survival e the more
proximate target ‘physical wellbeing’. This is a practical criterion
since every individual can experience the physical wellbeing of
their body; this criterion also seems to be sufﬁciently relevant
because pain and sickness (absence of wellbeing) correlate well
with reduced chances of survival, as is supported by the experi-
mental ﬁnding that animals that have experienced sickness
immediately after having eaten certain food, henceforth refuse to
eat the same or similar food (Garcia, Lasiter, Bermudezrattoni, &
Deems, 1985).Making an estimation of physical wellbeing means that along
with each action simulation an additional simulation activity is
performed that considers the consequences that the intended ac-
tion might have regarding physical wellbeing. I follow Anil Seth by
assuming that this simulation builds on a combination of physio-
logical change and cognitive appraisal (Seth, 2013). In process
terms this means that two complementary mechanisms cooperate:
I propose that a primary mechanism guards the relevance, and a
secondary mechanism ensures sufﬁcient decision speed. The pri-
mary mechanism is based on interoception, the sense of the in-
ternal physiological condition of the body (Seth, 2013). This
mechanism employs chemical information about that condition in
the form of particles such as neurotransmitters, hormones and
immune system cells, which reach the brain via blood veins and
lymphatic vessels. The secondary mechanism performs a neural
emulation of the primary mechanism in case an immediate deci-
sion is desired (Damasio, 1999); it is quicker because neural signals
travel faster than particles in a blood stream. The secondary
mechanism is trained by the primary mechanism during ontoge-
netic development; it seems likely that after this training the pri-
mary mechanism remains active in the background for checking e
and if necessary for correcting e the activities of the secondary
mechanism. Note that in this view all decisions are embodied since
they depend e directly or indirectly e on the primary valuation
mechanism; this also counts for rational decisions.
The simulation of physical wellbeing produces a ‘decision value’,
a quantitative indication of the desirability of the intended action
that allows making decisions. A decision value that is delivered
solely by the primary mechanism I call a ‘somatic response’, or
more loosely: the ‘gut feeling’ that indicates whether one ‘feels
good’ or ‘feels bad’ about the subject matter. This type of response is
univocal, even in complex situations; therefore, apart from inade-
quate biases that may be present, the primary valuation mecha-
nism is generally a rather reliable basis for action. In contrast, a
decision value produced by the secondary valuation mechanism
may depend on a variety of rational arguments, so it is generally far
less univocal.
2.5.2. The decision process
The ﬂow diagram of an action decision process in Fig. 2 shows
how two action simulations, each having a valuation process
operating in parallel, contribute to reaching a decision. The envi-
ronmental context for these simulations is provided by the OFM
that is continually updated by prepared perception. Evaluation of
the produced values leads to the choice of the most desirable ac-
tion. Subsequently a ‘go/no go’ function determines whether the
chosen action is to be executed or not: it is executed only if the
associated value indicates that this action is sufﬁciently desirable.
The decision to execute an action is accompanied by an initiative
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mind for the action. Examples of action preparation processes are:
(i) emotion-related processes that optimize the physiology of the
body for the action, and (ii) the pre-activation of the neural net-
works that are expected to be involved in perceptual activities
during the action, which involves messages known as ‘efferent
copies’ of the outgoing signal (Wolpert et al., 1995). These processes
are likely to have evolved since they improve the chances of sur-
vival by minimizing action delay.
Decision processes are essential elements of action preparation.
Parts of action preparation may be described e similar to the way
Friston describes perceptione as a cascade, or a nested assembly, of
decision loops, where the decision outcome in one loop provides
boundary conditions for decision-making in the next loop.
In conclusion, three types of predictions are important for
making decisions: the OFM,which is elaborate and relatively stable,
and the simulations of action options (Section 2.2) and of physical
wellbeing (Section 2.5.1), which are numerous, evanescent and
sketchy.
2.5.3. Memory
In the constructivist perspective, a memory is an active mental
construction of what is supposed to have happened in the past,
based on the OFM information that is currently available. Experi-
mental evidence supports this view (e.g., Schacter, Guerin, &
Jacques, 2011). The construction mechanism behind memory
retrieval is probably similar to the mechanism that constructs ob-
ject concepts (Section 2.4.1). Note that this type of memory differs
fundamentally from the address-based memory found in digital
computers.
2.6. Process structure
Language-related mental processes can be given an appropriate
place in this process model by assuming that two different struc-
tures exist in the organization of mental processes. This assumption
comes close to the ‘system 1- system 2’ segregation proposed by
Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011); a main difference lies in the
choice of what ‘makes the difference’: Kahneman regards attention,
not process structure, to be decisive.
I call the two different process structures ‘serial’ and ‘organic’,
respectively. A serial structure is a relatively simple, almost linear,
arrangement of items such as the sequence of words in a sentence.
Organic structure is more complicated: it looks like an irregular
spider web. Organic processes typically contain several parallel
process pathways with numerous interconnections and crossings;
examples are action simulation and action orchestration. Most
animal mental activity consists of organic mental processing. I
speculate that the main reason why humans are capable of so-
phisticated verbal communication, rational thinking and long-term
planning is that they acquired exceptional serial processing skills
during evolution.
To illustrate the difference, consider a woman who wants to
cross a busy trafﬁc road. She observes the passing vehicles. Based
on those observations she ‘senses’ e by means of sketchy organic
simulations e the trajectories that the vehicles will follow during
the next few seconds, and her options for crossing the road. When
she tells later about this episode she employs serial language. Of
interest here is that a stark contrast exists between the seemingly
effortless manner in which she carries out this organic action
preparation, and how extremely hard it is to describe that process
verbally in full detail.
One of the ways in which serial and organic mental processes
can cooperate is that serial signal patterns impose a serial structure
on the organization of a group of organic processes, which AndyClark calls ‘scaffolding’ (Clark, 1997). Serial signal patterns may play
this dominant role because on average they are more stable than
organic signal patterns, a property that e in turn e follows from
their relatively low number of process bifurcations that makes
themmore easily sustainable. An example of this cooperation is the
automatic shaping of the handwhen reaching for a cup of coffee: an
organic orchestration of muscle activities that is guided by the se-
rial plan of having coffee.
Rational thoughts and explicit understanding are products of
serial mental processes; intuition is a product of organic mental
processing. Organic mental processing takes the lion's share of the
action orchestration activity that occurs within the CNS. Impor-
tantly, organic processes seem to be non-existent notwithstanding
their numerical majority, for the simple reason that it is hard e if
not impossible e to be consciously aware of them. Hence the illu-
sion that our mental activity mainly consists of rational thinking,
and hence the difﬁculty of apprehending how intuition ‘works’,
unless one has a process model available.
3. The workspace formulation of mental processing
The previous section addressed the functions of elementary
mental processes; this section zooms in on what happens inside
these processes, and presents a strategy for formal process
description. The approach followed here has been inspired by the
‘free energy principle’ introduced by Friston and his co-workers,
which states that all the quantities in a system that can change,
will change in order to minimize free energy (Friston & Stephan,
2007). The concept of ‘free energy’ originates from physics where
it is employed in formal descriptions of the thermodynamical
properties of gases in closed systems; it was later generalized in the
context of machine learning to describe Bayesian inference of the
sort implemented by predictive coding (Dayan, Hinton, & Neal,
1995; Rao & Ballard, 1999).
First, a generative mechanism will be proposed that all mental
processes seem to have in common.
3.1. Signal generation by means of active noise shaping
As Section 2.4.2 described, stochastic itinerant neural activity e
called noise here e is continually present in all circuits of the CNS.
When a neural network selectively ampliﬁes this noise, signal
patterns emerge, seemingly ‘out of the blue’. The network sustains
those patterns as long as the ampliﬁcation gain exceeds the signal
losses.
A suitable metaphor is the laser. The word ‘laser’ is the acronym
for: ‘light ampliﬁcation by stimulated emission of radiation’. The
physical processes that operate inside the laser are described in the
caption of Fig. 3; they have much in common with the neural
processes that were just described, and they are well known.
Both in a neural network and in a laser the signal gain and the
signal loss depend on several parameters: general process param-
eters, the properties of the amplifying medium and boundary
conditions. Examples of general process parameters of a neural
network are: the noise level, the neuromodulator concentrations
and the energy supply situation; examples of medium properties
are: the neural layout and the selective ampliﬁcation characteristic
or ‘gain proﬁle’.
For the laser process a prominent boundary condition is mirror
reﬂectance. The inﬂuence of this boundary condition on the laser
process can be understood in terms of how the light wave resonates
within the stack of dielectric layers that each mirror consists of.
Similarly the signal feedback delivered by a neural network could
be described in terms of how the signal resonates in the network.
Of special interest is a phenomenon that I would call a
Fig. 3. Top: Laser process. In a laser medium atoms are excited, which means that in the atoms one of the outer electrons is brought into a speciﬁc high-energy state. During
‘stimulated emission’, the passage of a photon stimulates an excited atom to emit a second photon with the same wavelength, phase and direction. Both photons can, in turn,
stimulate more excited atoms to emit a photon, and so on, so that an avalanche of photons emerges that aggregates into a coherent and monochromatic light beam. Spontaneously
generated photons (symbolized by stars) trigger the avalanche. Accurately parallel mirrors at two sides of the laser reﬂect the beam. Any beam that is precisely perpendicular to the
mirrors travels many times back and forth, and is ampliﬁed with every passage. The result is an intense light beam, a fraction of which passes through one of the mirrors and
produces the laser output beam. The process of re-exciting atoms consumes energy; because the energy supply is limited, individual beams e each having its own speciﬁc
wavelength emust compete for energy. The beamwith the highest gain-to-loss ratio wins this competition. This is generally a resonating beam; resonance means that a multiple of
one wavelength ﬁts precisely between the mirrors so that the oscillations nodes of the wave coincide and the beam suffers minimum interference loss. Bottom: Neural process. Also
in a neural network spontaneous signal generation occurs (symbolized by stars), and signal patterns are selectively ampliﬁed. A neighboring network is depicted that provides
selective signal feedback, as is explained in Section 3.2.
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give to other networks depends on its resonance properties. So if
the process that is activewithin this network has an inﬂuence on its
resonance properties, that mental process modulates the network's
feedback potential. The importance of this phenomenon lies in the
fact that in this way processes in separate networks can impose
temporary boundary conditions on each other. Predictive coding
formulations of neuronal dynamics associate this phenomenon
with attention (Feldman & Friston, 2010).
If the network can sustain several discrete signal patterns
simultaneously, they must compete for the limited amount of en-
ergy that is available. Usually the competition process converges
towards a state of equilibrium in which the signal pattern with the
best gain-to-loss ratio dominates. A disruption of an existing
equilibrium e for instance by the arrival of an unexpected sensory
signal e means that the equilibrium needs to be re-established.
Since in neural networks the process conditions that govern the
competition vary continually, it may be expected that every new
state of equilibrium will be different from the previous one.
I propose to call this dynamical process of signal generation and
competition: a ‘boundary condition-determined active noise
shaping’, or BANS process. To summarize, the occurrence of a BANS
process requires the presence of: (i) iterant dynamics (noise), (ii)
selective ampliﬁcation, (iii) process boundary conditions, (iv)
limited energy supply, and (v) signal competition. An example of a
BANS process in the physical realm is the laser process described in
Fig. 3.
An interesting example of the correspondence between the
BANS processes in a neural network and in a laser concerns the
concept of ‘precision’ that is employed in predictive coding de-
scriptions of mental processes (Feldman & Friston, 2010). In my
interpretation, precision is a measure of the selective ampliﬁcation
gain in a neural network. It mainly depends on two factors: the gain
proﬁle of the network and the selective strength of the signalfeedback from surrounding networks. In analogy, the two main
factors that determine the selective ampliﬁcation gain or ‘reso-
nance quality’ of a laser are: the gain proﬁle of the laser medium,
and the wavelength-dependent reﬂectivity of the mirrors. There-
fore the resonance quality of a laser seems to be comparable with
the precision of a neural network.
In this context it is interesting to note that e as Karl Friston
pointed out to me e much of the theory behind self-organization
and synergetics (Haken, 1981) derives from the statistical physics
of lasers.
3.2. The two stages of a mental process
BANS processes are generative: they can create new mental
entities, and they can eliminate (prune), alter andmaintain existing
mental entities. (A mental entity is deﬁned here as a relatively
stable signal pattern; an example is a thought that is paid attention
to). Because a BANS process can ‘make things happen’ in a neural
network, it can be seen as a driving power behind the process at
system-level, in which system-level is the level of description
where the focus is on the function of the mental process. This
process engine is fueled by neurophysical mechanisms that are not
discussed here. Since I am not aware of alternative mechanisms
that have the same function, I assume that the BANS process con-
stitutes the main system-level process engine in all mental
processes.
Since BANS processes require the presence of boundary condi-
tions for their operation, and since all mental processes depend
directly on their process engine, in every mental process two
components can be distinguished: its process boundary conditions,
and the operation within those boundary conditions of a BANS
process that brings about the functionality of the mental process.
Since the creation of the ﬁrst necessarily precedes the second, in
this view all mental processes always operate in the same
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operation of a BANS process. Section 3.4 will discuss how this ﬁxed
process pattern leads to a formal process description.
Importantly, the characteristics of the two process components
are quite different: the BANS process is a relatively simple and
‘blind’ generative mechanism, while the combination of boundary
conditions can be highly complex. The latter determines for a large
part the functionality potential that resides within the neural
network, whereas the BANS process merely expresses that func-
tionality in the sense that it makes the information contained in the
network externally available in the form of an output signal pattern.
Important aspects of this approach were proposed earlier in
Campbell's evolutionary epistemology that is based on the princi-
ple of blind variation and selective retention (Campbell, 1974). This
mechanism is also found e as Campbell pointed out e in biological
evolution where the emergence of complex biological organisms
follows from a ‘blind’ struggle by generations of individuals e with
only a limited behavioral repertoire at their disposal e for survival
in a complex and merciless environment (Bickhard & Campbell,
2003).
3.3. The workspace formulation of mental processing
Also mental processes beyond the level of neural networks can
be described in terms of interactions between BANS processes and
their boundary conditions. For discussing those processes it is
convenient to introduce the concept of ‘workspace’. The workspace
of a BANS process consists of the total of process conditions and
boundary conditions that are relevant for the BANS process. Having
this concept available makes it, for example, possible to state that a
theoretical framework provides a suitable workspace for a scientiﬁc
investigation, and that awell-posed question opens up aworkspace
for a discussion.
The size and scope of a workspace depends on the associated
process task. For instance, the mental workspace provided by the
culture of a society is of quite a different magnitude than the
workspace that is used for preparing a simple action. A funda-
mental property of workspace is that one's total mental workspace
e the sum of all the workspaces that are currently sustained within
one's mind e imposes strict limits on what one can think of and
learn, and on the actions that one can undertake. This is related to
the assertion made in Section 2.2 that action preparation does not
primarily aim at the physical environment but at the OFM.
Workspaces are often available for a longer period of time than
is necessary for their use, either because they decay relatively
slowly, or because they are maintained on purpose. An example of
slow decay is the somatic response e deﬁned in Section 2.5.1 e
called rage, which can for instance be aroused by the suspicion that
one has been fooled; ragemay linger on for a considerable time. The
culture of a society is an example of a maintained workspace; it
lasts over many generations, while individuals adapt to it within a
lifetime.
Now that the concept of workspace has been introduced, the
two-stage description of mental processes presented in Section 3.2
can be given the more general formulation that I would call the
‘workspace formulation’ of mental processing: in all mental pro-
cesses, an appropriate workspace is created ﬁrst; then the opera-
tion within that workspace of a BANS process brings about the
functionality of the mental process.
Here are some examples of the application of this formulation to
some of the mental processes discussed earlier: (i) Prepared
perception (Section 2.4.2) consists of: setting up a mental work-
space related to a speciﬁc uncertainty in the OFM, followed by the
orchestration e within that workspace e of a search for informa-
tion in the environment. (ii) During an action decision process(Section 2.5.2), the OFM provides the environmental workspace for
BANS processes that perform simulation activities. Subsequently,
the outcomes of these activities set up a mental workspace for
evaluation in which another BANS activity selects the most desir-
able action, which in turn sets up a workspace for the BANS process
that orchestrates the execution of action.
Because most workspaces have a complicated organic (Section
2.6) structure, it is hard to be consciously aware of them. However,
one may notice the mental effort that the maintenance of a work-
space requires, or its inverse: the absence of an expected mainte-
nance effort. The latter may explain the mental state called ‘ﬂow’. If
the orchestration and execution of a complicated action are so well
attuned to each other that the created workspaces are immediately
used, then no workspace maintenance effort is noticeable,
regardless of the difﬁculty of the task. In that situation ﬂow can be
experienced, i.e. the state of ‘being fully immersed in a feeling of
energized focus, full involvement, and enjoyment in the process of
the activity [… ] characterized by complete absorption inwhat one
does’. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990)
3.4. Formal description of mental processes
The BANS process shares an interesting aspect with Bayesian
probability calculus: both depend critically on an external factor
and an internal factor. In the case of a BANS process these factors
are the boundary conditions and the gain proﬁle (Section 3.1), and
in the case of probability calculus: the prior probabilities and the
sensitivity function. This similarity has inspired me to formulate
the following hypothesis: if it is possible to describe a mental
process as an interaction between a BANS process and boundary
conditions, then it should also be possible to describe that process
in terms of probability mathematics, and therefore in terms of
probabilistic inference in the brain. In the latter description the
boundary conditions are represented by prior probabilities, and the
gain proﬁle by a sensitivity function.
If this hypothesis could be validated, then all the ingredients
needed for formally describing mental processes are present: (i) a
two-stage formulation that makes it possible to address every
mental process in the same way, (ii) a matching formal description
method, and (iii) a connected model of mental processing.
Following on from this general basis, it may be possible to address a
diversity of mental processes e such as action simulation, objecti-
ﬁcation, prepared perception, embodied valuation and the noise
repair process e in a coherent fashion.
4. Discussion: how do signal patterns provide boundary
conditions?
A remarkable phenomenon occurs in several of the mental
processes discussed in this paper: a consolidation process forges a
relatively stable mental entity from more evanescent and ﬂeeting
signal patterns. It is necessary to assume that such a process is
active in order to explain how process boundary conditions are
constructed (Section 3.3), how the serial mental processes that
allow humans to reason and talk are created fromorganic processes
(Section 2.6), and how the object concepts are constructed that
build the OFM and therebymake anticipation possible (Section 2.2).
So this phenomenon plays a crucial role in the proposed model of
mental processing.
It may be possible to describe this consolidation process in
terms of the interaction of a BANS process with boundary condi-
tions, but the difﬁculty is that such would seem to lead to inﬁnite
regress: some of the boundary conditions are e according to this
description e signal pattern consolidations that presuppose the
activity of earlier BANS processes that operated in the context of
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no inﬁnite regress takes place: every cascade has a neurophysical
starting point. Such initiation may, for instance, follow on from a
genetic or epigenetic predisposition that creates a workspace early
in ontogenetic development, similar to the imprinting phenome-
non seen in newly hatched goslings. Another possibility is that a
noise signal pattern (Section 3.1) provides a suitable starting point
by chance.
A more serious problem is that the mechanism underlying the
consolidation process is unclear. Two other basic processes that
were discussed earlier in Section 2.4.2 are problematic in a similar
way: (i) the detection of uncertainty within the OFM on which the
initiation of prepared perception relies, and (ii) themeasurement of
OFM coherence on which the noise repair process rests. Gaining a
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms would be
highly relevant for the further development of the proposed pro-
cess model.
5. Results and conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical framework consisting of three
parts: a process modele inwhich the ‘organic forwardmodel of the
environment’ plays a central role e, a general view of mental
processing called the ‘workspace formulation‘, and a strategy for
formally describing mental processes. Although the aim of this
framework is to create a suitable workspace for investigating pre-
diction in action, the framework may also be useful for investi-
gating mental processing in general.
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